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THE STRATEGIC JUSTICE: 
 
THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS  
 
Courtney H. Alonzo 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTI O N 
 
After nearly ten terms on the bench, Chief Justice John Roberts has reflected 
minimalism in his opinions, considered the views of his colleagues, and has utilized 
precedent in interesting ways. Notwithstanding, Roberts has been results-oriented, and even 
methodical, in reaching particular conclusions. He has exhibited brilliant creativity in 
circumventing precedent and framing innovative yet conservative approaches to the law. 
Although he does not easily fit into a particular philosophical category, Roberts has 
assembled varying methods, resulting in a type of “mosaic” judicial philosophy. Some even 
call it strategic.1 
In 1993, by the age of 37, the now-Chief Justice John G. Roberts was arguing before 
 
the U.S. Supreme Court as the Principal Deputy Solicitor General regarding issues ranging 
from Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment to Title IX. “Widely considered the 
best Supreme Court advocate of his generation, Roberts was known before his ascension 
to the Court as a gifted writer, a skilled strategist, and a brilliant legal mind.”2 
Unsurprisingly then, since 2003, Roberts has been working from the other side of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 See Paul M. Barrett, John Roberts, Chief Conservative Strategist, Businessweek (April 10, 2014), 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-10/john-roberts-leads-supreme-court-shift-to- 
the-right. 
2 
LAURENCE TRIBE AND JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 8 (2014). 
2  
podium — first as a judge on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and since 2005, as the 
 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Although Roberts resists a label on his judicial philosophy, to some, the Chief is an 
originalist, a fundamentalist, and perhaps even a perfectionist.3 However, his elementary 
teacher may have had it right all along, referring to the young John Roberts as “crafty.”4 In 
his opening comments at his confirmation hearing for the position, Roberts made clear that 
he envisioned a Court different from the previous, which that many felt was more politica lly  
driven  and  resulted  in  over-broad  decisions  and  hard-to-apply  law. 5  The Judiciary 
Committee questionnaire provides much insight into Roberts’ perspective. 6 
Roberts highlighted the importance of modesty and humility numerous times in his 
responses and stated that “precedent plays an important role in promoting the stability of 
the legal system.”7 
According to Roberts, the Court needed to exercise much more judicial restraint 
 
than it had in the past.8 The Chief sought to guide the Court towards a more minimalist ic 
and narrower-reaching approach that honored precedent. More specifically, Roberts stated 
that he intended to promote judicial minimalism, seek more consensus from the Court, and 
encourage more respect for precedent and stare decisis.9 Roberts also asserted that he 
 
 
 
 
 
3 MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT : THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 22 (2013). 
4 See Purdum et al, infra note21. 
5 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55, 141-42 (2005) [hereafter Roberts 
Confirmation Hearing]. 
6 See Nancy Gibbs, Perry Bacon Jr., and Viveca Novak, 5 Things You Need to Know About Roberts, Time. 
(September, 5, 2005) Vol 166 Issue 10, p28-32, 28. 
7 Id.; see also Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 5 at 55. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.; see also Chief Justice Say His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 
22, 2006) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/washington/22justice.html. 
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understood the importance of separating his personal views, including religion, from his 
judicial reasoning, in order to make proper legal decisions.10 
An attempt to uncover the Chief Justice’s unique philosophy requires a 
comprehensive look at both the influences throughout his life, as well as the cases bearing 
his name. Part I consists of a biography of John Roberts, providing an inquiry into what has 
most influenced the Chief throughout his life, from childhood to Chief. Part II analyzes two 
representative sets of cases by the Chief to illustrate the ways Roberts has utilized various 
tactics, namely judicial minimalism, consensus, and respect for precedent, in order to reach 
particular results. Ten cases will be covered — a compilation of majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions — in chronological order, to gain a better understanding of this 
multifaceted approach. Finally, Part III discusses Roberts’ “strategist” philosophy and how 
it has facilitated his ultimate goal of preserving the Court as the supreme legal forum. 
 
 
 
PART I. BIOGRAPHY: THE FOUNDATION OF A PHILOSOPHY 
John Glover Roberts, Jr., was not “genetica lly engineered” to be the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, but it sometimes seems that way.11 His life prior to the Court, from 
his childhood through his judgeship on the D.C. Circuit, is best described as an almost 
effortless rise to the top.12 Regardless, the man who would eventually take the top seat in 
our highest court was recognized early on for his brilliance and charm.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Id. 
11 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 262 (2007). 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 203 (2011). 
20 Purdum et al, supra note 14. 
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The journey of the 17th and presiding Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court  begins  in  Buffalo,  New  York  on  January  27,  1955. 14  Roberts’  parents  were 
Rosemary (Podrasky) and John Glover (aka “Jack”) Roberts, Sr., an electrical engineer and 
executive with Bethlehem Steel. 15  When John was in the fourth grade, the Roberts, 
including his three sisters, Kathy, Peggy, and Barbara, moved to Long Beach, Indiana.16 
John Roberts had excellent educational opportunities from his early years. Roberts 
attended  Roman Catholic grade school Notre Dame Elementary then La Lumiere School, 
a prestigious all-male Catholic boarding school in a neighboring La Porte, Indiana.17 "I 
won't be content to get a good job by getting a good education, I want to get the best job by 
getting the best education," Roberts wrote, at the age of 13, in his 1968 admission letter.18  
Therefore it is no surprise that Roberts was not only an excellent and dedicated student, he 
was also incredibly involved and well-rounded. He was captain of the varsity football team, 
wrestled, sang in the choir, served as an executive on student council, co- edited the student 
newspaper, and participated in drama.19 
His teachers also recognized his intellect. One even used the young Roberts as a 
rubric for her teaching – “[i]f he understood the concept, I was good…if not, I would teach 
it all over again.”20 A classmate from La Lumiere recalled an English teacher describing 
 
 
 
 
14 Todd S. Purdum, Jodi Wilgoren and Pam Belluck, Court Nominee's Life Is Rooted in Faith and Respect 
for Law, The New York Times (July 21, 2005) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/21/polit ics/21nominee.html. 
15 Id. 
16 STEVENS, supra note 13. 
17 Purdum et al, supra note 14. 
18 Tim Jones, Andrew Zajac and Andrew Martin, John Roberts’ Rule: Reach for the Top, Chicago Tribune 
(July 24, 2005) available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-07-24/news/0507240376_1_john- 
roberts-hogan-hartson-new-liberalism/2. 
19 John G. Roberts, Jr., The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law (hereinafter Oyez), 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr (last visited November 5, 2014); see also id. 
29 Purdum et al, supra note 14. 
5 
 
Roberts’ papers as “outrageous but very well crafted.”21 In addition to his extraordinary gift 
for writing, Roberts’ also shined as an oral advocate; another classmate recalled his 
distinctive ability to make an incredibly persuasive argument even at such a young age.22 
Unsurprisingly, Roberts was valedictorian of La Lumiere Class of 1973.23 
 
Roberts aspired to be a history professor and attended Harvard University (then 
Harvard College). 24 He also worked for Bethlehem Steel during summers to help finance 
his education, a fact stated by Bush when he publicized Roberts’ nomination to indicate that 
he was not someone to whom all was handed.25 He graduated in 1976 summa cum laude 
and a member of Phi Beta Kappa with his bachelor’s in history in only three years.26 
Roberts then attended Harvard Law School.27 Although he initially thought he was not 
 
“good enough” for Harvard Law, Roberts ultimately served as the managing editor of the 
 
Harvard Law Review, where a colleague included Justice Ginsburg’s daughter, Jane.28 
 
While at Harvard, Roberts excelled academically and stood out for his mild temperament 
and respect for differing perspectives.29 
By the time John Roberts began applying for clerkships as a second year, the status 
of the position in legal culture had begun to change from an informal process into a “highly 
competitive ideological identifier” where lower court clerkships were becoming essential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 8 (2012). 
24 Oyez, supra note 19. 
25 Jones, et al, supra note 18. 
26 John Roberts, Bio.com, available at http://www.biography.com/people/john-roberts-20681147 (last 
visited Sep. 10, 2014). 
27 Purdum et al, supra note 14. 
28 Id.; see also TOOBIN, THE NINE, supra note 11. 
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prerequisites for Supreme Court placement.30 Irrespective, Roberts’ academic performance 
caught the eye of prominent Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Henry Friendly.31 
Roberts graduated from Harvard Law magna cum laude in 1979 and was Friendly’s first 
choice as clerk for the 1979–1980 term.32 
Not only was Judge Friendly one of the most well-respected appellate-level judges 
in the country at the time,33 both Roberts and Friendly were originally from small upstate 
New York towns, had a profound appreciation for education, and graduated from Harvard 
and Harvard Law.34 Friendly also began his legal career as a clerk for one of the most 
respected  judicial  figures  of  an  earlier  generation,  Justice  Brandeis. 35   Roberts’ 
conservatism  also  appealed  to  Friendly. 36  Friendly  was  hospitalized  during  Roberts’ 
clerkship and greatly relied on the prized student during this time as a result.37 
While on the Second Circuit, Judge Friendly was regarded as a conservative who 
epitomized  the  practice  of  judicial  restraint. 38  Friendly  also,  however,  demonstrated 
“remarkable creativity in circumventing precedent and formulating new rules in multip le 
areas of the law.”39 During his confirmation hearings, Roberts described his former boss 
as a man that had “total devotion to the rule of law and the confidence that if you just worked 
hard enough at it, you’d come up with the right answers.”40 Friendly has also been 
 
 
 
 
30 Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to 
Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST . L.J. 1149, 1215 (2010)(internal citation omitted). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1216; Purdum et al, supra note 14. 
33 TOOBIN, THE NINE, supra note 11. 
34 Snyder, supra note 30, at 1218 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Jones, et al, supra note 18. 
38 DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA (2012)(publisher’s  description). 
39 Id. 
40 Roberts Confirmation Hearing at 202. 
7  
referred to as “the archetypal judge’s judge, a meticulous craftsman, a fine writer, and hard 
to pigeonhole politically.”41 Roberts tends to exhibit some if not all of these qualities. 
Friendly undoubtedly had a noticeable influence on John Roberts, not only in reference to 
his approach to the law, but in utilizing creative means in order to find the correct answer. 
Roberts then accepted a clerkship with the not-yet-Chief Justice William Rehnquis t 
on the United States Supreme Court.42 Rehnquist was considered a leading conservative in 
his era and undoubtedly stood out amongst the primarily-left Court of that time.43 The 
thirteen months Roberts spent in Rehnquist’s chambers spanned from the 1980 election 
through the dawn of the “Reagan revolution” in D.C.44 “It was a time when the Supreme 
Court was far different, more liberal, and that made John Roberts stand out among the other 
clerks.”45 
Additionally, at least at that point in his career, Rehnquist did not demonstrate much 
respect for precedent and also preferred narrower analyses.46 Rehnquist was more results-  
oriented and restrained, “instead of writing exhaustive opinions that defined entire areas of 
law.” 47 One of the ideals that Roberts admits he learned from Justice Rehnquist was 
concision, stating that he learned “to try to write crisply and efficiently” from him.48 
Although Roberts may not take an identical approach to that of Rehnquist, he undoubtedly 
learned methods suitable for his developing perspective. In fact, “sprinkled through the arc 
 
 
 
41 Roger Parloff, On history's stage: Chief Justice John Roberts Jr., FORTUNE (January 3, 2011) available 
at http://fortune.com/2011/01/03/on-historys-stage-chief-justice-john-roberts-jr/. 
42 Snyder, supra note 34. 
43 Dorsen, supra note 38. 
44 Adam Liptak and Todd S. Purdum, As Clerk for Rehnquist, Nominee Stood Out for Conservative Rigor, 
The New York Times (July 31, 2005) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/polit ics/politicsspecial1/31roberts.html?pagewanted=all. 
45 Id. 
46 Snyder, supra note 30 at 1223-24. 
47 Id. at 1224. 
48 Id. 
8  
of Judge Roberts's career” are hints of Justice Rehnquist's influence, from memorandums 
the young Roberts wrote in his early years to decisions Roberts has issued.49 Rehnquist also 
taught Roberts the value of balancing family and work.50 
Although Roberts’ clerkships were quite different experiences, “legal analysts 
believe that working for both Friendly and Rehnquist influenced Roberts’ conservative 
approach  to  the  law.” 51  Both  Judge  Friendly  and  Justice  Rehnquist  believed  in  the 
“limitations of judging," and tended to be more minimalistic in their approach.52 However, 
each provided Roberts with different sets of tools that helped structure his mosaic: Friendly 
was creative and determined; Rehnquist was more focused on results and efficiency 
amongst the Court. Roberts knew how to selectively pluck methods from his mentors to 
carve his own path. 
It is also worth noting that according to a fellow former Rehnquist clerk, Roberts 
had a gift for presenting a case in such a way that enabled the judges to rule in his favor 
without feeling that he or she was drifting too far from precedent.53 This was an ability that 
the Chief continued to cultivate, regardless of whether in public or private practice. 
Following these esteemed opportunities, Roberts embarked on an entirely different 
path than that of his predecessors in order to gain a more diverse perspective.54 From 1981 
to 1982, Roberts worked for the Reagan Administration as a Special Assistant to U.S. 
Attorney General William French Smith, and from 1982 to 1986 Roberts served as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Liptak, et al, supra note 44. 
50 Id; see also Snyder, supra note 30. 
51 Bio.com, supra note 26. 
52 Jones, et al, supra note 18. 
53 Id. 
54 Snyder, supra note 30 at 1225. 
64 Id. 
9 
 
Associate Counsel to President Reagan.55 As a young Reagan Administration aide, he 
registered his skepticism toward court-recognized "fundamental rights," such as the right to 
privacy.56 Although Judge Friendly suggested not spending “too much time in the public 
sector,” Roberts gained much of his formative legal experience while under the Reagan 
Administration.57 
Roberts admired the court as an institution so appellate advocacy intrigued his 
analytical mind. 58   Following his stint in the public-sector, Roberts went private in 1986 
as an Associate for Hogan & Hartson in their Washington D.C. headquarters,59 becoming 
partner after just one year.60 Gaining this type of experience appeared a natural progression 
towards the federal bench and his was yet another calculated step in forging his own path 
and developing his own unique philosophy.61 While at Hogan & Hartson, Roberts was 
known for “crisp writing, obsessive preparation and smooth-as-glass performances in court. 
He never seemed flustered or defensive, and his authoritative tone made even the most 
complicated legal parsing sound as obvious as 2 plus 2.”62 This type of advocacy required 
a type of acting yet Roberts managed to demonstrate reasonableness whilst doing so.63 He 
played to his audience, just as he had in the past.64 Since his early years at La 
 
 
55 "Former Hogan & Hartson Partner John G. Roberts, Jr. Confirmed as Chief Justice of the United States" 
(Press release), Hogan Lovells, (September 29, 2005); Purdum et al., supra note 14; see also OYEZ, supra 
note 19. 
56 Charles Lane, Roberts Was Influenced by Critics of the Warren Court, The Washington Post (September 
6, 2005) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501433.html. 
57 Snyder, supra note 30 at 1225. 
58 Michael Grunwald, Roberts Cultivated an Audience with Justices for Years, The Washington Post 
(September 11, 2005) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091000807.html. 
59 Purdum et al., supra note 14. 
60 Snyder, supra note 30. 
61 Grunwald, supra note 58. 
62 Id. 
63 Snyder, supra note 30. 
70 Id. 
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Lumiere, Roberts has consistently created experiences that not only honed his existing 
abilities but also added new sets of skills to his legal arsenal. 
In 1989, Roberts was called back to serve for the republican George H. W. Bush 
administration as Principal Deputy Solicitor General, where he stayed until 1993.65 The 
Solicitor General's office was a type of “way station for almost every prominent Supreme 
Court specialist, offering unparalleled opportunities for bright, young lawyers to gain court 
experience,” and Roberts excelled.66 By this time he was confident in his oral advocacy 
skills and returned to the public sector, ready for whatever opportunity to gain more 
experience. Towards the end of his term as Solicitor, President Bush nominated Roberts to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; however, no Senate 
vote was held and the nomination expired.67 
In 1993, Roberts returned to private practice at Hogan & Hartson, harmonizing the 
importance of balance he learned from Rehnquist.68 Rehnquist fostered in Roberts the 
necessary balance between work and family, and Roberts applied this concept facilitat ing 
a balance between the public and private sector, which made him an even more 
comprehensive advocate. This time around at Hogan & Hartson, Roberts became the head 
of the appellate practice within the firm and argued some 39 cases before the Supreme 
Court, prevailing in 25.69 But Roberts maintained a level of humility; after being asked why 
he lost a case 9 to 0, Roberts’s response was that there were only nine justices.70 Even 
 
 
 
 
 
65 Purdum et al., supra note 14. 
66 Grunwald, supra note 58. 
67 Purdum et al., supra note 14. 
68 "Chief Justice John Roberts," PBS NewsHour (March 9, 2007). 
69 Grunwald, supra note 58. 
78 Id. 
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as an advocate, Roberts devoted his career to interpreting the Court's decisions, searching 
for correct legal answers based on records, statute, and precedent.71 
In 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Roberts again for a seat on the D.C. 
Circuit Court, but the democratically controlled Senate successfully thwarted the efforts, as  
they  were  disinterested  in  another  right-wing  Circuit  Judge. 72  However,  Roberts’ 
nomination was resubmitted in early 2003 and was subsequently confirmed on May 8th of 
that year.73 Fully equipped with a comprehensive legal arsenal, the next move in his well-  
crafted plan was to gain a perspective from the other side of the bench. Roberts spent two 
years on the D.C. circuit where he participated in a number of notable rulings.74 “As a judge 
on the D.C. Circuit, Roberts’ record was generally conservative, though his approach 
seemed to be guided not by an ideology of originalism, but rather one of judicial restraint.”7 5  
Roberts’ life-long preparation climaxed two years later, on July 19, 2005 when a 
withdrawn nomination for Associate Justice turned into one for Chief.76 President Bush 
nominated John Roberts to the United States Supreme Court to fill a vacancy created by the 
anticipated retirement of Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. 77  At the time, 
Roberts was the first Supreme Court nominee since Stephen Breyer eleven years earlier.78 
However, in an unfortunate turn of events, the then-Chief, William H. Rehnquist, died on 
 
 
 
 
71 Id. 
72 Purdum et al., supra note 14 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Jeremy Byellin, John G. Roberts: The Conservative, Yet Apolitical and Consensus-Building Chief 
Justice, Thomson Reuters Legal Solutions Blog (August 29, 2013) available at 
http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/top-legal-news/john-g-roberts-conservative-yet-apolitical- 
consensus-building-chief-justice/. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
12  
September third of that year, while Roberts’ confirmation was still pending before the 
Senate. 79   Two  days  later,  the  President  withdrew  Roberts’  nomination  as  Justice 
O'Connor's successor, and announced his new nomination — to Chief Justice — the seat of 
one of his own former mentors.80 
Roberts shined at his Confirmation Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
appearing before the panel of Senators as prepared as ever, just like in his oral arguments, 
needing no documents to reference.81 On September 22, 2005, the Committee approved 
Roberts’ nomination by a vote of 13–5, and the Senate confirmed Roberts’ nomination one 
week later, making him the 109th member of the Supreme Court.82 Roberts was only 50 years 
old when he took the bench as Chief Justice, making him the youngest member of the Court 
and the third youngest to have ever become Chief Justice.83 Roberts is also one of a mere 
thirteen Catholic Justices, out of 111 total, in the history of the Supreme Court.84 The 
distinctiveness of John Roberts’ age and religion were obstacles in his nomination that, but 
for his comprehensive legal arsenal, Roberts could not have overcome. 
“A certain humility should characterize the judicial role,” stated Roberts in his 2005 
 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing regarding his nomination.85 Roberts envisioned an 
approach that was both desirable and respectable: a minimalistic approach, more unanimous 
decisions from the Court, and adherence to and respect for precedent and stare 
 
 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine 28 (2007); see also generally Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 5. 
82 Purdum et al., supra note 14; see also Supreme Court Nominations, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm. 
83 Bio.com, supra note 26. 
84 Purdum et al., supra note 14. 
85 Roberts Confirmation Hearing, at 55. 
94 Id. 
13 
 
decisis.86 Roberts desired a Supreme Court consisting of individuals that were not afraid to 
learn from others who typically operate in a contrary school of thought. As illustrated next 
through a variety of cases, because Roberts is not narrowly driven by any type of ideology 
and prefers to approach cases individually, utilizing an array of various tools, he is often 
difficult to predict and has been known to surprise.87 
 
 
 
PART II. CASE STUDIES: ROBERTS’ PHILOSOPHY AS CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
Roberts penned his first dissent in Georgia v. Randolph where he utilized precedent 
to argue for a particular result.88 Here, the Court held 5-3 that police had no constitutio na l 
right to search a house without a search warrant when one resident consents and another 
objects.89 In 2001, the police were called to Scott Randolph’s residence when his wife 
reported a domestic dispute.90 Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police 
searched the home and found cocaine.91 The officers did not have a search warrant but 
Randolph’s wife consented, despite objection by Randolph.92 At trial, Randolph argued 
that because of the objection, the search violated his constitutional protections, and the 
prosecution argued that the wife’s consent was sufficient.93 The trial court ruled for in favor 
of the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court ultimately sided with 
Randolph, finding that a search violates the Fourth Amendment if one resident objects, 
regardless of whether another resident consents.94 
 
 
 
86 Roberts Confirmation Hearing, at 55, 141, 424. 
87 See Byellin, supra note 75. 
88 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 106. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 108. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
14 
 
Justice Souter delivered the majority opinion which focused on the authority that 
co-inhabitants may exercise that affect the others in the home.95 Souter then compared the 
reasonableness of this type of a search with that in Minnesota v. Olsen, where the Court 
held that “overnight houseguests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their temporary 
quarters,” and determined that such was a logical application to the case at hand.96 The 
majority concluded that under the Fourth Amendment, a “physically present occupant’s 
express refusal of consent to a police search of a premises was dispositive as to that 
occupant, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”97 
Chief Justice Roberts opened his quite-lengthy dissent, and first as Chief Justice, by 
stating that “the Court create[d] constitutional law” in its ruling. 98 From Roberts’ 
perspective, the Court’s prior cases established that co-inhabitants assume the risk that one 
or the other may share access to their belongings. 99 Roberts added that he feared the 
holding would limit the efforts of law enforcement seeking to protect abused spouses.100 
Roberts then stated that the “correct approach” already existed in Fourth Amendment 
precedent, and provided extensive case law in support.101 
Since he sought a different outcome, Roberts made clear that he had an issue with 
the majority reaching beyond its authority and failing to practice judicial restraint. 102 
Roberts believed the majority’s analysis “alter[ed] a great deal of established Fourth 
 
Amendment law” and as such, “a warrantless search [was] reasonable if police obtain the 
 
 
 
 
 
95 Id. at 111. 
96 Id. at 113; 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
97 Id. at 122-23. 
98 Id. at 127. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
15 
 
voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it,” such as a co-inhabitant.103 Roberts 
resented the Court for not adhering to precedent, specifically, that the Court “circumvented 
existing doctrine and created a new standard by which Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
is to be measured.”104 
Roberts employed another tool from his arsenal to support his dissent in Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.105 Here, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a judge to recuse him or herself not 
only when actual bias has been demonstrated or when economic interest has been 
determined, but also when the facts show a probability of bias.106 
Here, mining company president Hugh Caperton filed a lawsuit against A.T. Massey 
Coal Company alleging tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent 
concealment, which ultimately resulted in the company going out of business.107 
At trial level, a West Virginia jury found in favor of Caperton and awarded $50 million in 
 
damages.108 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review; however, 
prior to hearing the case, Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself 
from the case.109 Caperton argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to 
Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice 
Benjamin's participation would present an unacceptable appearance of impropriety.110 
 
 
 
 
103 Georgia v. Randolph at 141, 128. 
104 Aubrey H. Brown III, Georgia v. Randolph, the Red-Headed Stepchild of an Ugly Family: Why Third 
Party Consent Search Doctrine is an Unfortunate Fourth Amendment Development That Should Be 
Restrained, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 471 (2009). 
105 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 869. 
116 Id. at 901. 
16 
 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion where the Supreme Court reasoned that 
Justice Benjamin must recuse himself from participation in the case in question because 
only “a risk of actual bias” was needed, not actual bias.111 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined the Chief in his forceful dissent, where Roberts 
 
argued that the majority carelessly expanded the standard for which a judge need recuse 
himself by merely showing a "probability of bias,” because it “cannot be defined in any 
limited way” and “provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be 
constitutionally required” of them.112 Roberts also raised the point that the Supreme Court 
had recognized only two situations in which the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause disqualified a judge113 and differentiated the objective nature of those two situations 
to the entirely subjective inquiry required by the “probability of bias” standard set by the 
majority.114 Roberts furthered his argument by adding that the result would “erode public 
confidence in judicial impartiality,” an ongoing concern of the Chief, and raised forty 
specific points of uncertainty that would arise as a result of the majority’s vague holding.115 
Roberts had a clear objective in this case — he did not want a categorical rule that 
would be incorrectly applied to all similar situations and result in a flood of unmanageab le 
due process litigation. Roberts complained that “the majority again depart[ed] from a clear, 
longstanding constitutional rule to accommodate an “extreme” case involving “grossly 
disproportionate” amounts of money.”116 The majority’s holding suggested that “massive 
 
 
 
111 Id. at 884. 
112 Id. at 890-91 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
113 When the judge has a direct financial interest and when a judge presides over a criminal contempt case 
in his own court. 
114 Caperton  at 891 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455 (1971)). 
115 Id. at 891; see also Id. at 893-98. 
17  
independent expenditures” can assist in creating the appearance “of quid pro quo 
corruption,” i.e. money for a vote.117 This helps explain Roberts’ conflict with the majority 
and illustrates his precedent tactic. 
Roberts also emphasized that the majority’s standard was excessively vague and 
even “inherently boundless,” and used forty questions to emphasize this point.118 With this, 
Roberts attempted to argue that the Court should try to avoid a “floodgates” problem by 
utilizing judicial restraint, which the majority failed to recognize. It also appeared to be his 
hope that a future Court might reverse this decision, and permit judges to be the sole 
evaluators of judicial partiality. 
Roberts utilizes a minimalistic approach in the criminal context as well, where he 
prefers case-by case evaluations rather than broad applications. His concurring opinion in 
Graham v. Florida illustrates this well. 119 In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that 
juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non-  
homicide offenses.120 Graham was sixteen when he committed armed burglary and assault 
and battery along with two accomplices.121 Six months later, Graham was arrested again for 
home invasion robbery.122 Though Graham denied involvement, he acknowledged that he 
was in violation of his plea agreement.123 The trial court found Graham guilty of both armed 
burglary and attempted robbery, sentencing him to the maximum “authorized by 
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law on each charge: life imprisonment and fifteen years, respectively.124 Because Florida 
had since abolished its system of parole, it became a life sentence without parole.125 
The majority concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of a 
life sentence without parole on a juvenile offender who committed a non-homicide crime.126  
However, the defendant need not be guaranteed eventual release from prison; rather, he 
or she must only have some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of the life 
term.127 Further, since it could not be conclusively determined at the time of sentencing that 
the defendant would be a danger to society for the rest of his or her life, a sentence of this 
magnitude “denies the juvenile a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”128 
Although Roberts agreed with the majority that Graham’s life sentence without 
parole violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment, ” 
Roberts criticized the majority for failing to limit its holding.129 Roberts felt there was “no 
need to invent a new constitutional rule of dubious provenance in reaching that conclusion” 
and based his reasoning on Court precedent.130 More specifically, the lack of culpability 
comparison of juveniles versus adults described in Roper v. Simmons and cases that required 
“‘narrow proportionality’ review of noncapital sentences.”131 Roberts also argued that the 
Court had not yet established a clear and consistent path for lower courts to follow when 
applying the “narrow proportionality” analysis and as a result, precedent required 
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that this type of deferential review encompass an analytical comparison between the crime 
committed and the sentence thereby imposed.132 
Although the majority focused on whether Roper v. Simmons should also apply to 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole, Roberts disagreed with how the majority 
applied the law.133 Roberts stated that “in Roper, the Court tailored its analysis of juvenile 
characteristics to the specific question whether juvenile offenders could constitutionally be 
subject to capital punishment,” not as “the basis for a new categorical rule that juveniles 
may never receive a sentence of life without parole for nonhomicide crimes.”134 He stated 
that precedent regarding “narrow proportionality” provided that the offender’s juvenile 
status should be at the center of the inquiry.135 
Roberts believed that the majority used this case as “a vehicle to proclaim a new 
constitutional rule,” and that it reached far beyond the current facts to reach a result.136 
Roberts felt that such a broad conclusion — that a life sentence without parole for a juvenile 
for any nonhomicide case is unconstitutional — was not only unnecessary but also 
unwise.137 Roberts again knew the precise result he wanted, one he believed was just, and 
this concurrence reflects his narrow decision-making tactic in the criminal law context. 
In Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One (NAMUNDO) v. Holder the Supreme 
Court ruled that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was unconstitutional.138 In this 
case, NAMUNDO sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to Section 4(a) of the VRA and 
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alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional.139   Section 5 prohibited “covered 
jurisdictions,” i.e. states and political sectors with histories of racial discrimination in 
voting, from changing voting procedures without preclearance from either the Attorney 
General or a panel of three judges from the D.C. District Court.140 The District Court 
rejected both claims and stated that the bailout under Section 4(a) only applied to “countie s, 
parishes, and subunits that register voters, not to an entity like the district that does not 
register its own voters.”141 Furthermore, the court rejected NAMUNDO’s argument that 
Congress' 2006 25 year extension of Section 5 rendered the provision unconstitutional.142 
In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the VRA permitted all 
political subunits, including NAMUNDO, to seek bailout from the preclearance 
requirements of the VRA.143 Writing for the Court, the Chief Justice stated that although 
the historic accomplishments of the VRA were undeniable, its modern applicability raised 
serious constitutional concerns.144 Roberts reasoned that although the Court historica lly 
upheld this provision of the VRA,145 conditions had “unquestionably improved,” and as a 
result, the burdens imposed by Section 4(a) of the VRA no longer justified current needs.146 
Roberts avoided addressing the constitutionality of the preclearance requirement of 
Section 5, stating that “normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there 
is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”147 Roberts acknowledged that the 
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Court’s approach stretched the statutory text, but he said it should avoid deciding difficult 
constitutional questions when it could. 148 Roberts rationalized that since NAMUNDO 
expressly described the constitutional challenge to Section 5 as an alternative to its statutory 
argument, it was not necessary to address.149 
Although Roberts ultimately decided the case on narrow grounds, he cleverly 
crafted new law in NAMUNDO.150 Roberts encouraged Congress to modify the VRA to 
account for the nation’s current needs and political conditions, not those based on 35 year 
old data.151 Despite utilizing judicial restraint with the narrow holding, Roberts clearly 
contradicted his intention to adhere to precedent in this opinion in order to achieve an 
overarching goal. Roberts allegedly long opposed the VRA by the time he became Chief 
and  outwardly  expressed  such  while  working  under  President  Reagan. 152   Roberts 
unapologetically embraces various mechanisms in order to reach particular results. Here, 
he utilized whatever means available to convey his argument that racial imbalance in voting 
was no longer an issue in the South. 
Roberts also cleverly plucked from his legal arsenal in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission (FEC), whereby he wrote a concurring opinion.153 Here, the Court 
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC, 
where the Court held that political speech may be banned depending on the speaker’s 
corporate  identity,  and  held  that  under  the  First  Amendment,  corporate  funding  of 
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independent political broadcasting in elections cannot be restricted. 154  Here, Citizens 
United sought an injunction against the FEC to bar the application of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie, which expressed opinions 
regarding then-Senator Hillary Clinton’s capabilities as President.155 
Section 203 of the BCRA is a federal law that prohibits corporate entities or labor 
unions from using their general treasury accounts for speech that is an “electioneer ing 
communication” or that expressly advocates for a candidate, negatively or positively.156 
The Court previously held that limits on electioneering communication may be banned 
 
based on the corporate identity of the speaker.157 Electioneering communication is any 
broadcast communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” 
that is made within 30 days of a primary election158 and is publicly distributed159. The D.C. 
District Court denied the injunction and held that Section 203 was constitutional as decided 
in McConnell v. FEC.160 
In a 5-4 decision, the majority held that under the First Amendment, corporate 
funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections could not be restricted.161 
Writing for the majority, Kennedy stated that political speech was “indispensable to 
decisionmaking in a democracy,” regardless of whether the speech came from a corporation  
or  an  individual. 162  He  concluded  that  this  constitutional  protection  was 
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inconsistent with Austin, and as a result overruled Austin and the portions of McConnell 
 
that relied on Austin. 163 
 
The Chief wrote separately "to address the important principles of judicial restraint 
and stare decisis implicated in this case."164 Roberts explained why his vote harmonized 
with his values of judicial minimalism, respect for precedent, and consensus that he so 
outwardly expressed.165 He highlighted that the general practice of judicial restraint does 
not trump the obligation of the Court to faithfully interpret the law.166 Roberts cited various 
case law in which the court had overruled precedent and argued that had prior Courts strictly 
adhered to stare decisis, "segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be 
unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first 
obtaining warrants.”167 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court “changed the case to 
give themselves an opportunity to change the law,” by purposely broadening the scope of 
the case in order to reach a particular outcome.168 Broadening the scope of the argument 
enabled Roberts to choose how much he wanted to benefit the Republican Party.169 The 
Chief knew that in order to reach a specific outcome, overruling precedent was necessary. 
However, given the emphasis he placed on judicial restraint and respect for precedent during 
his confirmation hearings, Roberts recognized that if he wrote the majority opinion he 
would be highly criticized. 170  By handing the opinion over to Kennedy, Roberts 
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accomplished “a far-reaching result without leaving his own fingerprints.”171 This was 
incredibly strategic on behalf of the Chief and vividly illustrates how Roberts strategica lly 
attains the results he desires. 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC is another case 
that emphasizes how Roberts puts his arsenal to use.172 Here, the Court unanimously ruled 
that federal discrimination laws did not apply to religious organizations' selection of 
religious leaders.173 In this case, Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, MI for allegedly firing her in violat ion 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) after she was diagnosed with narcolepsy. 
174   Perich  filed  a  complaint  with  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity Commiss ion 
(“EEOC”), which agreed and authorized a lawsuit against Perich’s employer.175 
Hosanna-Tabor structured its defense on the "ministerial exception" under the First 
Amendment. 176    This exception provides religious institutions with certain rights and 
concessions to manage employment matters without interference from the courts.177 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals vacated the grant and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial 
on the merits.178 The court then held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in 
nature and refused to apply the exception.179 
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Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court and discussed first the 
extensive history of the exception, highlighting that it was established to prevent state 
interference with the governance of churches, which violates the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.180 The bulk of the decision focused on whether 
or not Perich was a minister for the purposes of the exception, ultimately determining that 
she was.181 Roberts based this partly on the fact that the school held her out as a ministe r 
with a role distinct from that of its “lay” teachers.182 He also noted that Perich held herself 
out to be a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service required for her position 
and that she performed “important religious functions” for the Church.183 
Roberts, however, explicitly left undecided whether religious organizations could 
be sued for other reasons by stating "[w]e express no view on whether the exception bars 
other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious 
conduct."184 This was a “commendable example of judicial minimalism,” however, unlike 
his “forty questions” in Caperton,185 Roberts failed to work out all of the implications of 
the holding in advance, which created uncertainty.186 Roberts believed that the correct 
answer was found in the Constitution — the explicit separation of church and State. And 
although Roberts maintains that he separates politics from religion, he arguably desired 
ruling in favor of religious freedom. Regardless, in constructing the argument the way he 
did, Roberts utilized minimalism as the means to his end. 
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In 2010, President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), into law. The 
state of Florida, subsequently joined by twenty-five other states, several individuals, and 
the National Federation of Independent Business, filed suit in the Eleventh Circuit 
challenging both the individual mandate as well as the Medicaid expansion provisions of 
the Act.187 The challenge arose first because the ACA contained a minimum coverage 
provision, which was accomplished by amending the tax code and providing an individua l 
mandate, requiring that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and 
maintain a minimum level of health insurance were subject to a “shared responsibility” 
penalty, or a tax.188 Secondly, the ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which 
states were required to accept in order to receive federal Medicaid funding.189 The Court 
of Appeals upheld the Medicaid expansion as a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power, 
but determined that Congress lacked the power to enact the individual mandate.190 
The court also found that the mandate was severable from the ACA’s other provisions and 
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.191 
The questions therefore brought before the Supreme Court included whether the suit 
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (“Act”) by challenging the alleged tax; whether 
Congress had the power under the Taxing and Spending Clause to require individuals to 
purchase health insurance; whether the mandate was severable from the ACA; and finally 
whether Congress exceeded its powers to induce States to comply by threatening to 
withhold federal Medicaid funding. 
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This case is likely Roberts’ most infamous decision, at least from a societal 
perspective. Chief Justice Roberts cast the “swing vote” in the 5-4 ruling and delivered most 
of this lengthy opinion.192 First, the majority held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar 
the suit because Congress did not intend the individual mandate to be treated as a tax under 
the ACA.193 Roberts explained that this did not necessarily determine whether the penalty 
was a tax or not, but rather that it was not such that would bar suit under the Act.194 
Roberts also concluded that the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of 
Congress’ power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. 195 Roberts 
highlighted precedent in stating that although the Court had consistently construed the 
scope of power under the Commerce Clause as broad, it had a finite limit reaching only 
“activity.”196 Roberts furthered stating that although the mandate obligated individuals to 
become active in commerce, it did not constitute a regulation of existing commercia l 
activity.197 He then stated that the individual mandate only granted Congress the ability to 
create the precursor to the exercise of an enumerated power and that if the mandate was a 
“necessary” aspect of the ACA, then expanding such federal power to Congress was 
therefore improper.198 
In arguably the most controversial and critical aspect of the decision, Roberts 
concluded that the individual mandate was effectively an imposition of a tax, and that such 
a provision was within Congress’ power relegated by the Taxing Clause.199 Although he 
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acknowledged that this likely conflicted with the Court’s Anti-Injunction Act argument, he 
stated that, because the payment was not meant to induce the purchase of insurance, was 
not necessarily unlawful punishment, and was collected by the IRS by customary means, 
it qualified as such.200 
Finally, Roberts held that “the Medicaid expansion violate[d] the Constitution by 
 
threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline[d] to 
comply with the expansion.” 201  Roberts argued effectively that the Spending Clause 
depended on whether or not individual States voluntarily and deliberately accept the terms 
of the federal welfare programs.202 By threatening to reduce federal funding, Congress 
essentially coerced States into accepting the expansion. 203  As such, by removing the 
voluntary aspect, Congress exceeded its enumerated powers, which rendered the Medicaid 
expansion provision of the ACA unconstitutional.204 
Roberts caused quite a bit of commotion with this decision and is arguably still 
rather unpopular with conservatives as a result. 205  Roberts, however, did not appear 
hesitant regarding his objective, stating that the purpose was to “save a statute from 
unconstitutionality,” which albeit provocative from a political standpoint, aligns with his 
asserted drive towards consensus. 206 Furthermore, the Chief verbalized that he purposely 
chose to avoid a political battle by choosing his judicial beliefs over political pressure.207 
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However, according to Irvine Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, this ruling 
shifted the Commerce Clause from a broad “nationalist perspective” to a narrower and more  
restrictive  “federalist  perspective.” 208  Although  Roberts  stated  that  he  avoided politics, 
he had other objectives here.209 The previous (Rehnquist) Court reestablished a federalis t 
view, and Chemerinsky asserted that the ACA decision would indicate how much farther “the 
pendulum [would] swing.”210 Roberts’s opinion in Sebelius showed that the pendulum 
swung far right under the Commerce Clause, which ultimately further limited Congress’ 
power under the clause.211 Roberts was willing to sacrifice short term results in favor of 
long term objectives. 
More interesting perhaps, is just how much one of Roberts’ former mentors may 
have influenced this conclusion. Roberts likely discovered the creativity necessary to 
uphold the ACA on taxing power from Judge Friendly, and stored it in his legal toolbox.212 
Roberts worked on many opinions for Judge Friendly that utilized creative taxing powers, 
 
in fact, “[n]ot once during the period of Roberts’ clerkship did his boss write an opinion 
ruling against the government in a tax case.”213 Therefore, Roberts’ creative yet practical 
examination of the ACA was conceivably the result of extensive mentoring legal training 
and from Friendly.214 
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Roberts clarified that his analysis was a legal and not political, and in addition, 
Roberts persuaded six justices, including liberals Breyer and Kagan to limit Congress’s 
spending powers, surprisingly.215 Because he found an alternative constitutional rationale 
for upholding the individual mandate provisions of the ACA, the left was unable to criticize 
Roberts’ perspective. Roberts was instead admired for his cooperation with the liberals of 
the Court. So although Roberts swayed from his typically conservative posture and 
aggravated the right in this decision, he did so with a greater objective in mind. 
To understand just how strategic Roberts is in utilizing his conventional strategies 
to argue a particular outcome, it is helpful to examine another notable recent Court opinion. 
In United States v. Windsor, Edith Windsor was the widow and sole executor of the estate 
of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009, leaving her entire estate to her 
Spyer. 216 The couple lived in New York but was married in 2007 in Canada, and New 
York state law recognized their marriage.217 Because federal law did not recognize their 
marriage, the government denied the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses 
pursuant to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and imposed $363,053 in taxes.218 
The Court first held that the federal government retained a significant and 
“immediate” enough stake in the issue at hand to support Supreme Court jurisdiction, 
despite the Department of Justice’s corresponding position regarding DOMA’s 
unconstitutionality. 219 Further, because the decision pertains to a potential federal tax 
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imposition or refund, the government could potentially suffer economic harm and therefore 
maintained standing in the case.220 
The Court also held that the States have the exclusive power to define marital 
relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative as well as historical precedent by 
attempting  to  frustrate  such  authority. 221  The  Court  stated  that  “[t]he  Constitutio n’s 
guarantee of equality” cannot permit unjust treatment of a certain group of persons and 
therefore DOMA “violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to 
the Federal Government,” and is therefore unconstitutional.222 
In a brief dissent, Roberts agreed with the two other dissenters believing that the 
case should have been rejected on standing grounds, yet also pointed out the effective 
narrowness of the majority’s opinion.223 Regardless, he evaded specificity and stated that 
he failed to find an unconstitutional basis for the statute because of the overwhelming 
congressional and executive support when the Act was passed.224 According to Roberts, 
“interests in uniformity and stability amply justified” Congress’ enactment of the Act.225 
To him, without at least “some more convincing evidence that the Act's principal purpose 
was to codify malice, […] [he] would not tar the political branches with the brush of 
bigotry”  by  ignoring  Congress’  comprehensive  record. 226  He  also  argued  that  the 
majority’s opinion failed to address the issue of state definitions of marriage affecting 
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same-sex couples, which would inevitably come into play as the constitutionality of such 
definitions is questioned.227 
It appears his position, evidenced by his careful choice of language, was primarily 
aimed at producing harmony amongst the Court. Although he leaned conservative ly, 
Roberts asked his fellow Justices, both those siding with the majority as well as those in 
opposition, for collegiality, restraint, and respect for the legislature. Roberts also seems to 
have left himself some room regarding future cases turning on a similar issue. Generally 
speaking, Roberts’ dissent in Windsor illustrates his desire for consensus and also the use 
of his minimalism. 
In Missouri v. McNeely the Supreme Court held 5-4 that, generally, under the 
“exigent circumstances” exception of the Fourth Amendment, police must obtain a warrant 
before subjecting a drunk-driving suspect to a blood alcohol test.228 Here, a Missouri police 
officer stopped McNeely around 2a.m. after observing his truck “exceed the posted speed 
limit  and  repeatedly  cross  the  centerline.” 229  The  officer  suspected  McNeely  was 
intoxicated — McNeely had bloodshot eyes, was slurring his speech, and had the smell of 
alcohol on his breath.230 The officer subjected McNeely to several field sobriety tests and 
upon poor performance, attempted use of a portable breath device to detect his blood alcohol 
level.231 Upon McNeely’s repeated refusal, the officer transported him to a nearby hospital 
to have a blood sample taken.232 The officer did not attempt to obtain a search warrant and 
despite the officer’s continued explanation of the consequences, McNeely 
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refused to consent.233 McNeely’s blood alcohol content proved to be well above the legal 
limit in the state and he was subsequently charged with driving while intoxicated.234 
Justice Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion of the Court which determined 
that, as the facts were presented, an involuntary drawing of an individual’s blood qualified 
as a search as defined within the Fourth Amendment, and as such, required a valid search 
warrant.235 Sotomayor opened by discussing the general rule that the Fourth Amendment 
required a warrant to obtain evidence without consent.236 She followed that warrantless 
searches of an individual were reasonable, and the evidence received therefrom admissib le, 
if it fell within a recognized exception, namely the exigency exception.237 Sotomayor 
however went further and stated that since, in situations such as this, evidence may be lost 
under emergency- like circumstances, that the reasonableness of a warrantless search “must 
be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”238 
The Chief Justice chimed in with an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.239 Roberts agreed with the outcome but criticized the vagueness of the majority’s rule, 
stating that it did not provide straightforward guidance as to how police should handle cases 
like this.240 Roberts argued that since previous cases had already determined when the 
exigent circumstances exception should apply, that if there was time to secure a warrant, 
one should be secured, and if not, the exception should apply.241 In support of his argument, 
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Roberts cited several cases where exigent circumstances excused a need for a warrant.242 
 
Additionally, Roberts reminded the Court that it had previously “held that forced blood 
draws can be constitutional,” and ultimately disagreed with the Court’s failure to set forth 
a bright-line rule.243 
Roberts criticized the majority for creating new, difficult-to-apply law, and he 
 
argued aggressively for a less ambiguous rule. According to Roberts, reasonableness is the 
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” a concept bred from Rehnquist.244 However, such 
fact-specific analysis does not correspond with bright-line rules.245 Here, Roberts believed 
the correct answer required a bright-line rule and although this contradicted his traditiona l 
stance, he was well-reasoned and creative by arguing precedent.246 
Roberts also used his precedent tactic in McCullen v. Coakley, but in a much 
different manner than McNeely.247 In this case, the Court held unanimously that a 35 foot 
buffer zone around abortion clinics violated the First Amendment because it limited free 
speech too broadly.248 In 2007, Massachusetts amended its 2000 Reproductive Health Care 
Facilities Act, which had been enacted to address disputes regarding abortion outside 
abortion clinics, and expanded the buffer zone to 35 feet of an entrance or driveway of such 
facilities.249 Although the act made it a crime to stand within 35 feet of such facility 
regardless of one’s stance on the issue, it exempted four classes of individuals:  “persons 
entering or leaving” the facility, “employees or agents of the facility acting within the scope 
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of their employment,” government or law enforcement agents also “acting within the scope 
of their employment,” and individuals utilizing the sidewalk solely for transportation to an 
unrelated destination.250 
Petitioners sued the Attorney General and other officials claiming that the expanded 
 
buffer zones significantly hampered their efforts to provide “sidewalk counseling” with 
visitors of the facilities, claiming violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.251 The 
district court held that, although the law restricted the “time, place, and manner” of 
protected speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and provided 
ample alternative means of communication.252 The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
and held that in Hill v. Colorado the Supreme Court had previously affirmed an analogous 
statute in Colorado that prohibited similar activities within 100 feet of such clinics.253 
The issues then before the Court were whether the statute was constitutional under 
the First Amendment and whether Hill v. Colorado applied, and if so, should it be narrowed 
or overruled.254 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court and found that the 
Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment, yet sidestepped on addressing Hill.255 
Roberts first analyzed the First Amendment issue as introduced in the district court 
and agreed that although the law did restrict speech to a certain extent, it was content-  
neutral and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny.256 Roberts did however conclude that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 Id. at 2526 (citing § 120E1/2(b)(1)-(4)). 
251 Id. at 2528. 
252 Id.; 571 F. 3d 167 (2009)(citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)); see also Id. at 
2525. 
253 Id. at 2525; 708 F. 3d 1 (2013)(citing Hill, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)). 
254 Id. 
255   See generally id. at 2545 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
260 Id. 
36 
 
the statute did not satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement, which was ultimately its demise 
under the First Amendment.257 
Although Scalia agreed with Roberts and the rest of the majority, he raised a few 
points in his concurrence that uncovered Roberts’ strategy quite nicely.258 Scalia disagreed 
with Roberts regarding the content-neutrality and strict scrutiny of the statute, which 
emphasizes the minimalist approach that Roberts prefers to occupy.259 
Scalia also raised the point that the majority failed to even mention “whether Hill 
should be cut back or cast aside,” and stated that its reason for declaring the statute content-  
neutral  was  to  avoid  addressing  Hill  altogether. 260  This  directly  illustrates  Roberts’ 
deference towards precedent and his aversion of overruling cases. 
Roberts also tried to keep the opinion, or discussion therefrom, neutral, by failing to 
address Hill and by avoiding to consider the content of the speech of the abortion clinic 
employees. He kept the discussion politically-neutral and focused only on the issue of 
protected speech, without making it a solely right- versus left-wing, religiously-based 
argument. Although it appears he constructed a way to create more consensus among the 
members of the Court, his underlying goal was likely a more conservative result. 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Roberts has a legal arsenal at his disposal, one he assembled throughout his lifetime. 
Evidenced from the above sampling are three of his favored tools: judicial restraint, 
consensus, and precedent. First, Roberts approaches issues before the Court as narrowly as 
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possible, utilizing case-by-case analysis when advantageous. This permits Roberts to 
confront the merits of an issue only when necessary, and to save constitutional analysis for 
only essential situations. Secondly, consensus has been a focal point for Roberts during his 
tenure as Chief, and his persuasion has proven effective, especially in the most recent term. 
Finally, Roberts looks to precedent to reinforce his position, as well as to undermine 
reasoning he disagrees with. For Roberts, although the principle of stare decisis is central 
to a properly-functioning judicial system, reason trumps when necessary. 
The Chief is not an originalist like Justice Thomas or a textualist like Scalia.261 
 
Unlike these two colleagues of his, Roberts maintains a deep respect for both tradition and 
precedent, which has resulted in a colorful yet untraditional judicial philosophy.262 It is 
nonconformist, original, and authentic. It is unique to the Chief. He seeks justice and 
strategically utilizes whatever legal tools are available to reach the result he believes is fair 
— not only from a personal perspective, but from a broad one, considering both societal as 
well as legal norms and implications. 
In perhaps even his most “politically-charged” decisions, those regarding health 
care, voting rights, even campaign finance, “Roberts has embraced what are arguably 
contradictions, abandoned precedent without explanation, or both.”263 One thing is certain 
however, Roberts is brilliant — this is not mistaken legal reasoning.264 Roberts is willing to 
make unorthodox legal arguments and refrain from following his own reasoning in order to 
shift the law in the direction he desires.265 He is The Strategic Justice. 
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